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The author considers the positions taken by two countries which have always 
taken employee participation seriously
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The involvement of employees by such processes as giving information to, or the consultation of, such employees or their representation, and their 
participation, or that of their representative in decision 
making, takes place in a number of Member States of theo' 1
EU. The intensity and methods of such participatory 
processes varies in different member states of the EU. 
Employee participation in France and Germany has been 
chosen for the purposes of the present article, because 
such participation has long been of importance in these 
countries. The phrase "employee participation" is 
sometimes used in this article to include information and 
consultation, as well as codetermination or participation 
in the strict sense. The present article will not consider 
the implementation of the European Works Council 
Directive in France and Germany. This Directive (OJ 
1994, L2 54/64 amended by Directive 97/7 4/EC 
(OJ1998L10/22)) requires the establishment of a 
European Works Council, or a procedure for informing 
and consulting employees in the case of Community single 
undertakings or Community-scale groups of undertaking 
having at least 1,000 employees in the different member 
states and at least two establishments employing at least 
150 persons in each of two member states.
The above Directive has had a considerable influence 
on the proposed Directive of the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament establishing a general framework 
for improving the information and consultation rights of 
employees in the European Community. This proposed 
Directive has recently been the subject of a successful 
conciliation procedure between the Council and the 
European Parliament, was adopted on 11 March 2002 (OJ 
2002 E80/19). The Common Position adopted by this 
Council on 13 July 2001 may be found in the EU's 
Session Document C5-0388/2001 of 2 September 2001.
Employee representatives (delegues de personnel} were 
first introduced into France by a law of 24 June 1936. 
Works councils (comites d'enterprise) owe their origin to an 
Ordinance of 12 February 1945, which has been
subsequently amended on a number of occasions. The 
third French institution which represents the interests of 
the employees, the trade union section (delegates) in the 
undertaking, owes its origin to a law of 27 Decembero' o
1968. The French constitutional law of 27 October 1946, 
which is mentioned in the Constitution of 1958, refers to 
the need for employees to participate in the management 
of the enterprise. However, in contrast to the position in 
Germany, there is no requirement under French law for 
employee participation at board level. The law of July 1 
1986 did, however, provide for participation on the 
optional executive boards of public companies (societes 
anonymes). The position remains the same at present, 
under Article 225-27 of the latest version of the French 
Commercial Code.
Works councils have existed in Germany since the 
enactment of the Betriebsratungsgesetz of 1920. They were 
reintroduced in Germany after the downfall of the Nazi 
regime by the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Councils Act 
of 1952), which has been extensively amended, especially 
by the Works Councils Act of 1972. Important 
amendments were also made in 2001, when a new Works 
Councils Act was published. Special rules apply to staff 
representation in the public sector. As far as works 
councils in the private sector are concerned, the law 
changed in 2001, to take account of alteration in methodso '
of work and in technology. Trainees, external workers and 
employees using telephonic means of communication 
were included in the new definition of workers as also 
were persons working from home, whose principal work 
was for the establishment. In addition to German 
employees rights to be informed and consulted and to 
participate in certain decisions through the medium of the 
works council, German employees have the right to be 
represented on the supervisory boards of certain large 
companies. Three are three principal systems of such 
representation. The model in use in the coal, iron and 
steel industry is based upon a law of 1951 (Montan- 
Mitbestimmungsgesetz), that in enterprises of a certain type
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employing at least 500 employees is based upon 
paragraphs 76-77X 81,85 and 97 of the Works Councils 
Act 1952, as amended, and that in certain enterprises 
employing at least 2,000 employees is based upon the 
Codetermination Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz) of 1976. The 
present law relating to employees rights to information 
and to be consulted, as well as their rights of participation 
and codetermination are usefully considered in chapter 5 
and 6 of the third edition of Weiss and Schmidt, Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations in Germany, Kluwer, 2000.
THE POSITION IN FRANCE
As already indicated, three separate institutions 
represent the interests of the employees in an 
undertaking, which will have one or more of thesecv
representative bodies depending on the size of the 
workforce, and on whether the trade unions so desire. The 
relevant representative bodies are the works council, the 
personnel representatives and the trade union 
representatives. The latter are very frequently members of 
the works council. Collective agreements very frequently 
provide to what might be called the free expression group, 
which is concerned with the manner of exercises ol the 
collective right of freedom of expression regarding 
employment and conditions of employment, which is 
provided for by Article L461 -1 of die Employment Case 
(Code du Travail).
In addition public companies may provide in their 
articles that representatives of the employees may sit on 
the executive board.
Works councils
According to Article L431-1 of the Employment Code 
undertakings of all kinds, including those engaged in the
O 7 O O o
liberal professions and social security bodies (but with the 
expectation of certain public administrative bodies) which 
employ more than fifty persons for more than twelve 
months, whether consecutively or not, during the past 
three years, must establish a works council (comite 
d'enterprise). Elections take place every two years on the 
basis of lists of candidates which are submitted by trade 
unions only, and which correspond with the different 
categories of employees. However, different rules may be 
applicable where the undertaking has less than two 
hundred employees. These rules, are explained below. As 
in Belgium, the head of the undertaking (chef d'enterprise) is 
a member of the works council, and presides at meetings 
thereof. The works council also has union representatives. 
As in Germany, a central works council might be set upJ ' o I
where the undertaking has a member of differento
establishments, in addition to the works councils required 
for each establishment. This requirement is contained in 
Article L435-1 of the Employment Code. A group of 
undertakings may likewise be required to set up a group 
works council in accordance with Article E439-1 et seq of 
the Employment Code.
The works council was intended to be a framework for 
communications between employers and employees, and 
was also designed to foster a closer relationships between 
them. It has an important role relating to the provision of 
information, and must be considered before certain 
important business decisions are taken.
Article L432-6 of the French Employment Code 
provides that in the case of companies (the French term is 
societes which includes general and limited partnerships as 
well as public and private companies), two delegates from 
the works council, one representing the technical and 
supervisory staff (agents de maitrise), and the other the 
manual and clerical staff shall be entitled to attend all the 
meetings of the management or supervisory board. The 
number of delegates is increased to four in the special 
circumstance where there are three electoral colleges for 
the purpose of choosing personnel representatives: see 
Articles L432-6 and E433-2 of the Employment Code. 
The delegates from the works council are said by the 
second paragraph of Article E432-6 of the Employment 
Code to be entitled to the same documents as the 
directors.
According to Article E432-1 of the Employment Code, 
the works council must be informed of and consulted on 
questions of an economic nature concerning the 
organisation, management and general development of the 
undertaking and, in particular, on measures of a kind likely 
to affect the number or structure of the work force. It is 
also obligatory to consult the works council in good time 
on proposals to reduce the work force. Furthermore, 
Article L432-1 also provides that the works council must 
be informed of, and consulted on, modifications of the 
economic or legal organisation of the undertaking, 
especially in the event of mergers and transfers of the 
control of the company, and on important changes in the 
structure of the production of the enterprises, as well as 
on the acquisition or disposal of subsidiaries. Finally, 
Article E432-1 further provides that the works council 
must be informed of and consulted on situations in which 
the undertaking ceases to be able to pay its debts as they 
fall due, and in which it becomes subject to a process of 
judicial reorganisation. The provisions of Article L432-1 
remind one of those of Article 4(2)(a)-(c) of the proposed 
Directive of the Council of Ministers and the EP which has 
been mentioned above, but they are much more detailed 
than those of the draft Directive.
It follows from Article E432-4 of the Employment 
Code that the works council has a right of access to and 
a right to consult similar documents to the shareholders.o
According to Article L225-231 of the new French 
Commercial Code, the works council may ask the 
president of the local commercial court, acting in 
summary proceedings, for the appointment of one or 
more experts in order to obtain independent advice on 
any business transaction decided on by a public
27
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company. If the president of the local commercial court 
deems it appropriate to appoint an expert, he 
determines his powers and remuneration. The experts' 
report is made available to the works council, the 
statutory auditors, the public prosecutor and the board 
of directors or executive board. According to Article 
L432-5 of the Employment Code in any undertaking, 
the works council may require information upon any 
matter of any kind that might prejudicially affect the 
business of the company. If no such information is 
given, or if the replies given indicate that there is cause 
for concern, the works council must prepare a report 
which must be communicated to the managers and the
o
statutory auditors.
The powers granted to the works council described in 
the above paragraph do not find any parallel in the 
provisions of the Council and European Parliament 
Directive, which was enacted in 2002.
Personnel representatives
Such representatives must be elected where the 
workforce exceeds 10. The number of personnel 
representatives who are elected depends on the size of 
the workforce. Their principal function is the 
presentation of claims on behalf of the employees 
relating to employment regulations and rules 
(Employment Code, Article L422-1). The 
representatives are also empowered to communicate the 
suggestions and observations of the employees in matters 
within its competence to the works council. 
(Employment Code, Article E422-2 and E422-5) The 
personnel representatives have the right to take account 
of infringements of civil liberties in the undertaking and
o o
to contact the employer about them. The detailed rules 
are set out in Article E422-1-1. In undertakings having 
less than 200 employees, Article E431-1-1 of the 
Employment Code provides that the personnel 
representatives may form the employee delegation to the 
works council if the head of the enterprise so decides, 
and the works council and the personnel representatives 
are consulted in advance of this decision. Although, in 
such an event the two bodies have a similar composition, 
they will meet separately. In the absence of a works 
council (e.g. because of the lack of the necessary member 
of employees), the personnel representatives temporarily 
perform its economic functions (Employment Code, 
Article L431-3).
Trade union delegations
Such delegations (sections syndicates) must be selected in 
every enterprise having at least 50 employees. They are 
established by unions which are considered to be the most 
representative ones. Branches of the major unions treated 
as representative at the national level are irrebuttably 
presumed to be representative at the level of the 
establishment or enterprises. The delegations have the task
of furthering the interests of trade union members, and 
they may engage in collective bargaining.J J o o o o
Purposes of the different institutions
The purposes of the three different kinds of 
representative institutions cannot be thought of as entirely 
distinct. Thus, for example, the works council will 
sometimes try to coordinate the work of the personnel 
representative(s) and the trade union delegation. This is 
possible because the trade unions have some influence on 
the composition of the works council, which is chaired by 
the head of the undertaking. Where there is no works
o
council because the undertaking has insufficient 
employees, Article L431-3 makes it clear that the works 
council's economic functions will be temporarily 
performed by the personnel representative(s).
Employee representatives on the boards of public 
companies
According to Article 225-27 of the new Commercial
o
Code, public companies (societe anonymes, SAs) may provide 
in their articles that representatives of the company's 
employees will be members of the executive board. Such 
persons may be elected by the personnel of the company 
alone, or by such personnel and that if its direct and 
indirect subsidiaries, provided their registered offices 
(sieges social) are in France. The number of such directors 
must not be more than four, but may be increased to five 
in the case of companies whose shares are admitted to 
dealings on a regulated market. Directors who are elected 
by the employees must have a contract of employment 
with the company, or with one of its French direct or 
indirect subsidiaries which commenced more than two 
years before their nomination.
All the employees of the company, and in appropriate 
cases, of its direct or indirect French subsidiaries (whose 
registered offices are in France), who have been employed 
by the company for more than three months before the 
date of the election are eligible to vote, by secret ballot.
o J J
The candidates or list of candidates may be proposed by 
one or more representative trade unions, or by over a 
twentieth of the electors, or if the number of employees is 
more than 2,000, by 100 of them (new French 
Commercial Code, Article E225-28).
The maximum period of office of employee directors is 
six years, which is renewable. Such directors must be 
shareholders, and they have the same rights, duties and 
liabilities as other directors. Their office may cease on the 
result of their dismissal from employment, their 
resignation as directors or employees, or their dismissal 
from office as director by a decision of the president of the 
civil court (tribunal de grande instance) acting in summary 
proceedings, on the request of the majority of the 
directors (new French Commercial Code, Article L225- 
32).
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THE POSITION IN GERMANY
Works councils
According to paragraph 1 of the Works Council Act 2001, 
any establishment with more than five employees over the 
age of 18 of whom at least three have been employed there 
or at least six months is required to establish a works council. 
The same is true of a common establishment belonging to 
more than one undertaking which fulfils these conditions. 
However, it is left to the employees of the relevant 
establishment to decide whether they wish to hold an 
election. Many small establishments fail to comply with the 
mandatory requirements of law governing the establishment 
of a work council. Although works councils are separate 
from trade unions, their members are generally members of 
trade unions. If works councils exist in different 
establishments of an enterprise, these works councils must 
form a common works council (Gesamtbetriebsrat). (Works 
Councils Act 2001, paragraph 47). If an enterprise belongs 
to a group of companies, a group works council may be 
formed (Works Councils Act 2001, paragraph 54 et seq). In 
practice, such Konzembetriebsrate are of little significance (see 
Weiss and Schmidt, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
Germany, 3rd ed., Kluwer 2000, p. 149).
The term of office of works council members is four 
years, and tiiey may be re-elected. Candidates may be 
proposed by trade unions which have at least one member 
in the establishment, or by one-twentieth of the 
employees entitled to vote or at least three thereof. The 
size of the works council depends on the number of 
employees in the undertaking. Persons over the age of 18 
who have worked in the establishment for six months are 
eligible for election. This takes place by a system of 
proportional representation, unless only one electoral 
proposal is made, or the simplified electoral procedure 
applicable to small establishments employing between 5- 
50 persons is used, and a simple majority vote takes place. 
The works council is required to include members of both 
sexes, white collar and manual workers, and workers from 
different departments and pursuing different activities of 
the undertaking (Works Councils Act 2001, paragraph 
15). The executive staff, as defined in paragraph 5 of the 
Works Council Act 2001 neither participates in the 
election of works council members, nor may they become 
members of the works council. However an Act of 1989 
permits the election of a separate body for such staff.
As in the Netherlands, works council members are 
entitled to be released from their duty- to work without 
loss of pay to the extent necessary for properly carrying 
out their duties account being taken of the nature and size 
of the establishment. In establishments which employ at 
least 100 persons, the works council must appoint an 
economic committee and may appoint other committees 
and confer particular tasks on them. The works council of 
such an establishment can also entrust groups of workers 
with specific tasks.
The works council has a number of rights which extend 
from a simple right to information and to be consulted to 
a right of veto and codetermination. The right to 
codetermination is of much importance in relation to 
social matters: paragraph 87 of the Act enumerates 12 such 
matters, for example the length of die working day and 
provisions for the prevention of accidents at work. As far as 
certain economic matters (for example a merger or transfer 
of the undertaking) are concerned, the right of the works 
council to be informed and consulted are vested in the 
economic committee; there is no right to codetermination 
concerning such matters. However, the works council haso '
important participatory rights in relation to certain specific 
economic decisions involving a substantial alteration to theo
establishment which might cause significant hardship to its 
workforce, provided that such establishment employs at 
least 20 persons (Works Council Act 2001; paragraph 
111). Codetermination is of little significance in personnel 
matters.
Conflicts which arise between management and the 
works council may, and must in some cases be referred to 
a conciliation board (Einiaunastelle). Such a reference may 
be made where management and the works council are 
unable to agree on whether and how measures envisaged 
by the management in the case of a substantial alteration 
to the establishments have to be carried out.
Significance of the unions
Many works council members are also members of a 
union. Such unions have an initiating function, calling ao 7 o
works meeting in an establishment without a works 
council which decides whether or not such a council shall 
be established. The unions play a significant role in 
controlling the works council election procedure, and 
should legal rules be violated, a union may obtain a court
decision nullifving the election. In large companies,j o or'
unions frequently have their trusted representatives 
(Vertrauensleute) who form a link between the members of 
the union and its administration, and have an important 
influence on the works council activities.
Employee representation on the supervisory board
The supervisory board has considerable powers in 
German public companies. It thus exercises control over 
the management board, has an extensive right to 
information from it, can appoint the directors, and has 
important functions in relation to the accounts. Private 
companies are not normally required to have a 
supervisory board, but they may set up one on a voluntary 
basis. Large private companies which are subject to the 
three major codetermination laws discussed below are 
required to have a supervisory board; these laws extend 
rather similar provisions of the law governing public 
companies to them. In both public and private companies 
the management board (or managers) are responsible both 
for the management and representation of the company. 29
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The double board system dates from the nineteenth 
century.
Codetermination in the coal, iron and steel industry
As already indicated, there are three principal systems of 
employee participation in Germany. The model used in the 
coal, iron and steel industries involves the equal 
representation of shareholders and employees on the 
supervisory board, the neutral chairperson being elected by 
the majority vote of the shareholders and the employees 
representatives (Coal, Iron and Steel Codetermination Act 
1951, as amended, paragraph 8). The coal, iron and steel 
Codetermination Act applies to public and private 
companies and to incorporated cost book companies 
(bergrechtlichen Gewerkschaften) employing more than 1,000 
persons (Codetermination Act 1951, as amended, 
paragraph 1(2)). The supervisory board will have at least 
eleven members, which will be increased to 15 or 2 1 in 
very large companies (paragraphs 4 and 9, ibid). At least two 
of the employee representatives must belong to the 
workforce of the company. Two out of the three remaining 
members may, and generally do, belong to unions 
represented in the enterprise, but the third member may 
not belong to a trade union, or have a service agreement 
with or be an employee of, the enterprise, or have 
significant interests in it (paragraph 4(2), ibid). The 
workers' representatives are nominated together. Before 
such nomination takes place, the unions which are active in 
the enterprise and their executive organisations must be 
consulted (paragraph 6(1), ibid). Assuming that the 
supervisory board has eleven members, proposals regarding 
the remaining three seats (i.e. that of the remaining two
o v o
employee representatives and that of the additional 
member) will be made by the trade unions represented in 
the undertaking. Nominations will be made by secret ballot, 
and the persons nominated will be elected and confirmed 
in office by the general meeting, which is bound by theJ o o7 J
nominations made. The same rule will apply if the number 
of seats to be filled is more than 3 (paragraphs 6(3)   6(6), 
ibid.) In companies subject to the system of 
Codetermination of the coal, iron and steel industries, the 
Act of 1951, as amended, provides for employee 
representation on the executive board in the form of an 
employee director, responsible for labour and social affairs. 
Such a director cannot be appointed or dismissed against 
the majority of votes of the employee representatives on the 
supervisory board (paragraph \3(I), ibid.)
Codetermination in certain holding companies
Coal, iron and steel holding companies are subject to 
the special system of employee representation provided 
for in the Montan-Mitbestimmuneserganzungsgesetz of 1956, 
as amended. According to paragraph 3(2) of the statute, a 
controlling company is subject to this Act if the 
controlling company's turnover (account being taken of 
the relevant costs of raw and operational materials and of
services performed by third parties) from activities in the 
coal, iron and steel industries amount to one-fifth of its 
total turnover, or if at least 2,000 of the employees of the 
group are employed in the latter industries. The 
constitutionality of the requirement as to the number of 
employees (but not of that relating to turnover) has been 
denied by the Constitutional Court in a case which it 
belatedly decided in 1999 (B Verf G.99,367). The court 
held that this requirement violated Article 3(1) of the 
Federal Constitution which provides that all persons are 
equal before the law. The requirement as to the number of 
employees was capable of including largeenterprises which 
did not carry out sufficiently meaningful activities in the 
coal, iron and steel industry. It appears that paragraph 
3(2) may be amended in the fairly near future (see Weiss 
and Schmidt), op.cit. p.214), but no amendment was 
made to it by the new Works Councils Act of 2001.
Codetermination in accordance with the Works 
Councils Act, 1952
It is interesting to note that the relevant provisions of 
the 1952 Act regarding Codetermination, i.e. paragraphs 
16-11 a, 81,85 and 87 thereof, are the only provisions of 
this Act which remain in force. The Act is limited to public 
and private companies, limited partnerships with shares, 
incorporated cost book companies, cooperatives and 
mutual insurance companies. The entity in question must 
employ at least 500 persons. If it does so, one third of the 
members of the supervisory board must be representatives 
of the employees. According to paragraph 76(2), if one 
employee representative has to be elected, that person 
must be in the employ of the company. Should it be 
necessary to appoint two or more representatives, at least 
two of these must consist of employees of the enterprise. 
Employee representatives are elected by all the employees 
of the enterprise over the age of 18. According to 
paragraph 76(3) of the Works Councils Act, nominations 
must be made by the works councils, and by one-tenth of 
the employees of the enterprise, or at least 100 employees.
Codetermination under the 1976 Act
The above Act applies to public and private companies, 
limited partnerships with shares, incorporated cost book 
companies and cooperatives which regularly employ more 
than 2,000 persons. If an entity of one of the former kinds 
is the controlling company in a group, then the employees 
of the subsidiary companies are taken into account 
together with those of the controlling company for the 
purpose of determining whether the Codetermination Act 
1976 applies to the latter company (paragraph 5(1), ibid). 
The 1976 Act provides for an equal number of 
representatives of employers and employees. The actual 
size of the supervisory board is dependent on the number 
of employees, (paragraph 7(1), ibid). If the board has six 
or eight employee representatives, two of these seats must 
be reserved for trade union representatives. If the number
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of employee representatives on the supervisory board is 
10, the relevant number of trade union representatives is 
increased to three (paragraph 7(2), ibid. The remaining 
seats on the supervisory board are reserved for employees 
of the enterprise; they are distributed between workers, 
and executive staff (Leitender Angestelher). The executive 
staff are defined in the same way as in paragraph 5(3) of 
the Works Council Act 1972 (as amended). The 
distribution of seats depends on how the three categories 
of workers are represented in the undertaking, but if a 
category is represented at all it must have at least one seat 
on the supervisory board (paragraph 15(2) ibid.}.
The method of election of employee representatives is 
very complex. There are basically two types of election. If 
an undertaking employees more than 8,000 persons, the 
election takes place through the medium of delegates, 
unless the employees who are entitled to vote decide on 
direct elections. If the undertaking has less than 8,000o '
employees, direct elections take place, unless those 
employees who are qualified to vote decide that it shall take 
place through the medium of delegates (paragraph 8(1) and 
(3) ibid.}. A vote on the question whether the election is to 
take place through the medium of a direct vote or through1 O O
that of delegates must be requested by a motion signed by 
one-twentieth of the workforce of the undertaking. The 
ballot is secret. The relevant decision must be taken by at 
least one half the workforce eligible to vote (paragraph 9(3), 
ibid.).Whether an election of workers representatives is by 
delegation or is direct it takes place by a secret vote of all the 
categories of delegates of workers (including the 
executives). At least one executive must be appointed to the 
supervisory board. Voting is by a system of proportional 
representation, unless one nomination is made when the 
representatives are chosen by a majority vote. In such an 
event, the number of candidates must be twice the number 
of seats vacant for workers and executives representatives, 
(paragraphs 15 and 18, ibid.}. The trade union 
representatives mentioned in paragraph 7 of the 1976 Act 
are also elected by a system of proportional representation. 
There is a secret ballot of delegates representing the 
workers who are joined by the executives (paragraph 16(1), 
ibid. The candidates may be nominated by the trade unions 
which are represented in the undertaking or in other 
undertakings which belong to the same group as the 
controlling undertaking and who participate in the choice of 
the members of the latter undertaking's supervisory board 
(paragraph 5, ibid.}. If only one nomination is made, the 
trade union representatives are chosen by a majority vote 
rather than by proportional representation. Once again the 
number of candidates nominated must be twice that of the 
number of vacant seats (paragraph 16(2), ibid}. Both in 
direct elections and elections by delegates, the employees 
are entitled to reject any proposed union candidate (Weiss 
and Schmidt, op.cit., p.217).
Most decisions of the supervisory board require a 
simple majority. However a two-thirds majority is
required in the cases set out in paragraphs 27 and 29 of 
the 1976 Act. By paragraph 27 of this Act, the chairperson 
of the supervisory board is elected by a two third's 
majority of the members. If such a majority cannot be 
obtained, the shareholders' representatives elect the 
chairperson and the employees' representatives the vice 
chairperson. This rule explains why the chairperson is 
generally a representative of the shareholders, such that 
the Act cannot really be said to have created equal or 
paritative codetermination, because the chairperson has a 
casting vote if the first vote is tied (paragraph 29(2), ibid.}. 
This casting vote cannot be exercised by the vice 
chairperson but it may be exercised by a member of the 
supervisory board duly authorised by the chairperson, if 
he or she is unable to attend the meeting.
Constitutionality of the Codetermination Act 1976
Objections have been made to the system of 
codetermination introduced by the 1976 Act on the 
grounds that it may discourage investment, increase the 
powers of trade union officials and result in conflicts at the 
level of the supervisory board. It has also been contended 
that it may sometimes go beyond equal or paratative 
codetermination in its effect. There has also been 
controversy about the constitutionality of the 
Codetermination Act, but this would seem to be less 
significant since the Constitutional Court has found the 
Act to be constitutional in its decision of 1 March 1979 (B 
Verf G50, 290). The complaint that the Act was 
unconstitutional was made on several grounds, the mosto '
important of which seem to have been that it violated the 
guarantee of private property contained in Article 14 of 
the Federal Constitution and also violated Article 9(3) of 
that Constitution. The latter provision stipulates inter alia 
that the right to form associations for the purpose of 
protecting and enforcing employment and business 
conditions is guaranteed for everyone, and for all 
associations. It is treated by commentators as requiring 
the strict separation of employers and employees in the 
collective bargaining process (Tarifautonomie: See Hesse, 
Grundzuge des Verfassungsrechts, 20th ed., pub. Miiller, 1995, 
p. 180). The guarantee of private property was alleged to 
be infringed because it was argued that investors could not 
longer use their invested capital in the way in which they 
wished to.
The Constitutional Court rejected the arguments based 
upon the two above provisions, and also upon the other 
constitutional provisions cited by those who made the 
constitutional complaints. As far as the complaints based 
upon Article 9(3) were concerned, the Court found that 
although the Codetermination Act 1976 resulted in the 
mutual dependence of the shareholders and employees 
representatives on the supervisory board, these parties 
were different from those to a collective agreement which
o
were usually employers associations and unions. It should 
be noted that the independence of the parties to collective 31
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agreements may arguably be compromised by the 
continuous process of compromise and negotiation which 
takes place at supervisory board level. The approach taken 
by the employees' representatives (who will usually be 
union members) on the supervisory board will clearlv have 
some affect on the employers associations. The Court did 
not however think that this pragmatic fact was enough to 
compromise the independence of the two negotiating 
parties.
Although private property is guaranteed by the first 
sentence of Article 14(1) of the Constitution, the second 
sentence of that provision stipulates that the contents of 
this right and limitations thereon may be prescribed by 
law. Article 14(2) stipulates that property involves 
obligations, and its use should also serve the public good. 
The Constitutional Court took the view that Article 14(1) 
protects the substance of property rights, and that 
limitations thereon must comply with the principle of 
proportionality. It had no difficulty in finding that the 
ownership of shares conferred, both as far as the 
membership rights and the rights the assets it gave rise to 
were concerned, a kind of indirect ownership arising 
through the medium of companv law. Limitations on such 
ownership existed insofar as the shareholder was unable to 
make direct use, or dispose of it. The use of such right of 
ownership was limited by the principle of majority rule.
The Court found that the relevant provisions of the 
Codetermination Act 1976 were a restriction placed upon 
the use of property, which served the public good. It found 
that because it followed from paragraph 27(2) and 29(2) 
of the Codetermination Act 1976 that the ultimate 
decisions of the supervisory board remained within the 
power of the shareholders representatives, the property 
rights of the shareholders were sufficiently guaranteed. 
The Court also pointed out that the Codetermination Act 
of 1976 did not meaningfully restrict the value of the
O J
shares, on the prospective yield on them.
The Constitutional Court found that the 1976 Act did 
not establish a system of paritative Codetermination, 
because of the casting vote of the shareholders' 
representative on the supervisory board. It also 
emphasised that there was no form of Codetermination in 
the other organs of the company, the management board 
and the general meeting.
It is not clear from the judgement of the Constitutional 
Court whether a system of genuinely equal or paritative 
Codetermination at the level of the supervisory board 
would be constitutional. It must be remembered that it 
exists both in the legislation of 1951 and 1956 relating 
respectively to Codetermination in coal, iron and steel 
companies and in coal, iron and steel companies and in 
coal, iron and steel holding companies.
CONCLUSION
The French and German legislation on employee 
participation is more detailed than that contained in the 
framework Directive for informing and consulting 
employees in the European Community, which was 
recently enacted. The Directive would seem likely to have 
a greater effect in countries such as the United Kingdom 
and Italy, where there are few works councils or analogous 
bodies: in the United Kingdom, shop stewards and in Italy 
representative bodies connected with the unions, 
functioning at the level of the undertaking engage in
o o o o
collective bargaining. Works councils have sometimes been
o o
set up in these countries on a voluntary basis or in 
accordance with the 1994 Directive on European Works 
Councils, which was amended in 1997.
The detailed implementation of the framework 
Directive is left to the member states, which will be 
allowed to adapt the principles, definitions and 
arrangements contained therein to their national situation.
o
The Directive does not make use of the term works 
council, but it requires arrangements to be made at a 
national level for informing and consulting employees in 
undertakings employing at least 50 persons, or in 
establishments employing at least 20 persons, in a member 
state. Such arrangements would seem most usually likely 
to take place through the medium of a works council, or 
through that of a body akin to the French personnel 
representatives, who are not parallel by any corresponding 
German body.
Germany has gone much further than France insofar as 
employee participation at board level is concerned. This 
may be in part due to the existence of the dual board 
system in Germany. The differing three systems of 
employee participation at board level in that country owe 
their existence to historical and political circumstances. 
The new Directive on the information and consultation of 
employees does not mention employee participation at 
board level.
The Council Regulation on the European Company 
Statute was adopted on 8 October 2001 (OJ L294/1, 10 
November 2001), together with a Council Directive on 
the supplementing of the statute by the involvement of 
employees. The enactment of this instrument, which came 
into force on the date of its publication in the Official 
Journal, may encourage the Commission to do further 
work on employee participation in companies generally, 
but it does not contain original rules governing employee
o o o 1 J
paticipation. @
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